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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a default partial summary judgment
granted for failure of one of the defendants, Bert Slavens, to
appear for a deposition and thereat to produce documents.
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
On March 10, 1975, the Court ordered defendant Slavens1 answer to be stricken for his failure to appear at his deposition and
thereat to produce requested documents.

Accordingly, the Court

granted a default partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs against defendant Slavens.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL.
Defendant Slavens seeks a reversal of the default partial
summary judgment against him and an order remanding the dispute
for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal involves a default partial summary judgment which
was rendered in a construction contract dispute in which a defendant failed to appear at a deposition after being noticed and also failed to produce the requested documents.

In March of 1974

suit was commenced against two partners, who were doing business
as P.S. Construction Company.

(Tr. 36)

The partners, Bert Sla-

vens and Clinton Perry, had both agreed to construct a six-unit
apartment building and a residence, both to be located in Duchesne,
Utah.

(Tr. 4)

The price of the apartments was $71,025.00 and the

house $19,000.00.

(Tr. 4)

Plaintiffs claim to have paid these

amounts and, subsequently, there have been mechanic's liens filed
against the property by subcontractors.

The plaintiffs claim to

have also paid some of these,later claims.

(Tr. of pretrial 3)

• ~2~
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On March 14, 1974, service of process was obtained in Green
River, Wyoming, on defendant Slavens*

(Tr. 7)

On March 27, 1974,

notice was given to defendant Slavens that he was to appear at
10:00 o f clock on April 26, 1974, at the office of Hatch, McRae &
Richardson, 370 East 5th South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, (Tr.
9) to have his deposition taken.

On March 27, 1974, Slavens' at-

torney, Gary Stott, was also served with a demand for production
of specified documents (Tr* 1 3 ) , which documents were to be produced at the scheduled deposition to be held April 26, 1974.
Defendant Perry appeared and was deposed (Tr. 5 3 ) , however,
defendant Slavens failed to appear and also failed to produce
the requested documents.

(Tr. 17)

On April 29, 1974, Gary Stott,

who had been counsel for Slavens, withdrew as attorney for Slavens
but continued to represent defendant Perry.

No notice to appoint

counsel nor to appear in person was ever given to Slavens.
On May 21, 1974, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary
judgment, which motion was based partially on Slavens1 failure
to appear and his failure to produce documents at the April 26th
deposition.

(Tr. 18 and Tr. 9 of pretrial hearing)

The motion

had been made under the authority of sanctions authorized by Rule
37 of the U.R.C.P. (Tr. 9 of the pretrial hearing), in which plaintiffs sought, among other relief, to strike Slavens1 answer.
17)

(Tr.

Defendant Perry filed an objection to plaintiffs1 Motion and

defendant Slavens, who, at this time was not represented by counsel, failed to respond.

(Tr. 17)

summary judgment was denied.

On June 4, 1974, the motion for

(Tr. 2 4)

However, almost a year la-

ter, on March 10, 1975, the Court reversed itself and ordered this
previous denial set aside.

(Tr. 52)

On December 20, 1974, a pre-

-3- .
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trial conference was. held (Tr. 28) , at which time S. Rex Lewis entered an appearance as counsel for defendant Slavens*

At; this pre-

trial hearing/ the plaintiffs1 motion for a summary judgment, previously denied, was discussed.

(Tr. 28)

The Court said it would

re-examine the plaintiffs1 motion for summary judgment (Tr, 8 of
pretrial hearing) and the Court also allowed counsel, S. Rex Lewis,
to file an amended pleading for defendant Slavens, which the Court
agreed to consider.

(Tr. 28)

On December 24, 1974, an amended answer and counterclaim supported by counter-affidavits in response to plaintiffs1 affidavits
were filed by counsel for Slavens.

(Tr. 37)

The clerk allowed

this answer and counterclaim to be filed although the Court had
not granted approval.

On December 30, 1974, a counterclaim was

•also filed by defendant Perry.

(Tr. 29)

On February 7, 1975, oral argument was held on plaintiffs1
motion for a summary judgment and defendant Slavens1 counsel1s
motion to amend his pleadings.

(Tr. 28)

The Court orally pro-

nounced from the bench that Slavens1 answer be stricken and a default partial summary judgment was granted.

Later, on March 10,

1975, a default partial summary judgment was formally entered against defendant Slavens because the file contained no justification for Slavens1 nonappearance nor any justification for his failure to produce the requested documents.

(Tr. 51)

Slavens1 answer

was ordered stricken, his default entered therein, and a default
partial summary judgment of $3,841,66 (Tr. 65) was rendered against
him, (Tr. 51) with the Court reserving the right to enter further •
judgment against Slavens.
The action is still proceeding as to the defendant Perry
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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based upon the complaint and defendant Perry's counterclaim,
which is the same as the counterclaim of defendant Slavens.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT I
SLAVENS NON-APPEARANCE AT HIS DEPOSITION AND HIS FAILURE TO
PRODUCE DOCUMENTS WAS NOT WILLFUL, .THEREFORE, IT WAS ERROR FOR THE
COURT TO ENTER SUCH A DRASTIC SANCTION AS A DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
Judge Sorensen ordered the answer of defendant Slavens stricken because of his failure/ after being properly noticed, to appear
at a deposition in a law suit filed in Utah County, which deposition
was scheduled for April 26, 1974, in Salt Lake City, apparently for
the convenience of plaintiffs1 counsel at a time when Slavens was
residing in Wyoming.

Slavens also failed to produce certain re-

quested documents at this scheduled deposition.

The court1s.auth-

ority to impose such a drastic sanction, as a default judgment,
was invoked under Rule 37 of the U.R.C.P*

-

Changes have recently been made in both Utah Rule 37 and Federal Rule 37.

Rule 37 imposes the necessary sanctions in.order to

effectuate discovery.

The 1970 amendments to the Federal Rule re-

placed the term "refused" with the term "failure" throughout
37.

Rule

This was done in order to emphasize that imposing sanctions did

not require willfullness but merely a failure to comply.

After the

1370 amendments, Federal Rule 37 now provides that any failure to
appear at a deposition or to answer questions to interrogatories or
to respond to requests for production will subject one to any one or
more of the numerous sanctions in what is now (b)(2) of Federal Rule
37.

Effective June 1, 1972, Utah Rule 37, which imposes sanctions,

was also changed so as to be identical to the previously changed
Federal Rule 37.

Judge Sorensen made his ruling under the author-

ity of Rule 37, U.R.C.P., which is now and was identical to the
Federal Rule on sanctions.

Therefore, it is appropriate for an
-6-
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appellate court to examine how other courts have interpreted Federal Rule 37 as a guide to whether Judge Sorensen committed error.
Under the old Federal Rule 37, which had contained the term
"refusal" rather than "failure", courts had trouble formulating
any clear definition of "willfulness" in regards to conduct.

Un-

der the old rule in 19 62, the Fourth Circuit, .in Weston & Brooker
Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 303 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1962), had
interpreted willfulness under (d) of Rule 37 as a "conscious or intentional failure to act as distinguished from an accidental or a
voluntary noncompliance."

The Fourth Circuit stated:

The sanctions authorized by Rule 37(d) should
not be applied in the absence of wilful failure to
comply with the provisions regarding discovery; however 'wilful failure1 does not necessarily include a
wrongful intention to disobey the rule. A conscious
or intentional failure to act, as distinguished
from an accidental or involuntary non-compliance,
is sufficient to invoke the penalty. Id. at 92-93.
In 1970, amendments deleted the word "willful", however, even
after these 1970 amendments to Federal Rule 37, willful conduct
was still required by courts before imposing such a severe sanction as a default judgment.

There exists extensive authority that

a willful refusal to appear at a deposition or to produce documents is a necesary prerequisite to the imposition of such a severe sanction as a judgment by default.

The Supreme Court of the

United States in a case decided in 1958, in Societe Internationale
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958), held that willfulness continues to
play a role along with various other factors in imposing sanctions.
Even after the 1970 amendments to Federal Rule 37, courts still
continued to require a standard of "willful conduct" as a prerequisite to imposing the severe sanctions provided for in (d)(2)
of Rule 37.

As authority, Slavens cites the case of Flaks v.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Koegel, 504 F.2d 702 (2nd Cir. 1974), in which the Second Circuit,
In September, 1974, said:
The argument that willful refusal to
obey an order to respond to interrogatories or
to appear for a deposition is not a necessary
prerequisite to the imposition of any sanction
under Rule 37 is premised on the position that
the 19 70 amendments to Rule 37 eliminated from
the Rule the term "willful," which had previously been employed to characterize the conduct
which would trigger the sanctions of the Rule,
We do not accept this argument. The 197 0 amendments were intended to authorize the court,
where it deemed appropriate, to impose more flexible and softer sanctions for Rule 37 violations
than theretofore provided. However, there was
no intent to eliminate the willfulness elementwhen the harsh sanction of the dismissal of a
complaint or the striking of an answer was ordered. This is made clear in the note of the
Advisory Committee on the Rules. The Committee
stated:
Two related changed are made in
subdivision (d): the permissible sanctions are broadened to include such
orders "as are just"; and the requirement that the failure to . appear or respond be "wilful" is eliminated. Although Rule 37(d) in terms provides for
only three sanctions, all rather severe,
the courts have interpreted it as permitting softer sanctions than those
which it sets forth. . . . The rule is
changed to provide the greater flexibility as to sanctions which the cases
show is needed.
The resulting flexibility as to
sanctions eliminates any need to retain
the requirement that the failure to appear or respond be "wilful.". . . "Wilful Iness" continues to play a role,
along with various other factors, in
the choice of sanctions. Thus, the
scheme conforms to Rule 37(b) as construed by the Supreme Court in Societe
-Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197,
208 [78 S.Ct. 1087, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255]
(1958).
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 2 8 U.S.C.A.
Rule 37, at 45, 47 (Supp. 1974) (citations omitted),
(emphasis added) Id. at 708.
Professor Moore, a leading authority on procedure, believes
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that no court should impose such a drastic sanction as a default
judgment, which is authorized by Rule 37, unless willfulness has
been shown,

4 Moore, Federa .1 Practice, §33,28, n. 2; §37.04 n.

2 (2nd Ed- 1950).

For further support that such sanctions are

imposed only for willful conduct, see Herald v. Computer Components International, Inc., 252 S.2d 576 (Fla. 1971), in which the
Florida court said:
The sanctions provided under this rule,
particularly the striking of pleadings and dismissal of a cause should be imposed only in the
exceptional case. The federal courts in interpreting the federal counterpart to Rule 1.380
have had considerable difficulty in delineating
exceptional cases. There have been indications
that the exceptional case is where the recalcitrant party has acted in wilful disregard of or
with gross indifference to an order of the court
requiring discovery. . . Id. at 577.
In Societe Internationale, supra, the United States Supreme
Court said that "willfulness was relevant to the selection of sanctions."

As late as September, 1974, the Second Circuit had once

again affirmed willfulness as a necessary element for the imposition of such a severe sanction as a default judgment.

In Hart v.

Wolffs 489 P.2d 114 (Alaska 1971), the Alaska Supreme Court said:
The next question is whether dismissal was a proper sanction for refusal to comply
with the order to produce the documents. First,
it should be noted that application of Rule 37
sanctions against a party who has failed to make
discovery is not proper unless the court finds
that there has been a "willful refusal on the
part of a party ordered to make discovery***."
Oaks v. Rojcewicz, 409 P.2d 839, 840 (Alaska
1966) (emphasis added by court) Id. at 118.
For further support that willfulness is the required standard
of conduct necessary in order to impose such a severe sanction as
a default judgment, see Marriott Homes v. Hanson, 50 F.R.D. 396
(W.D. Mo. 1970), Morton v. Retail Credit Co., 128 Ga.App. 446,
'.Law
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter
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196 S.E.2d 902 (1973); Cinelli V, Radcliffe, 317 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1970)?
Robison v. Transamerica Ins, Co,, 368 F.2d 37 (10th Cir. 1966);
Patterson v. C I . T . Corp., 352 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1965); Gill v.
Stolow, 240 F.2d 669 (2nd Cir. 1957); Foster v. Brooks, 7 Ariz.App.
320, 438 P.2d 952 (1968); Oaks v. Rojcewicz, 409 P.2d 839 (1966); Z
Zakroff v. May, 8 Ariz.App. 101, 443 P.2d 916 (1968).
The Utah Supreme Court has never directly ruled on whether
the standard of conduct in imposing sanctions is one of willfulness.

However, in dictum, in Tucker Realty Inc. v. Nunley, 16

Utah2d 97, 396 P.2d 410 (1964), the Utah Supreme Court clearly indicated that any such conduct must be willful in order to impose
such a severe sanction.
Not only must the conduct be willful, but the trial record
must clearly reveal such willfulness.

The record on appeal in

the instant case fails to show any such willful misconduct by
defendant Slavens.
A case which is similar to the instant case was Swindle v.
Reid, 242 So.2d 751 (Fla. 1971), in which a plaintiff-taxpayer
sought to enjoin the assessment and collection of certain intangible personal property taxes levied in Palm Beach, Florida.

The

defendant-tax assessor initiated extensive discovery procedures,
including a motion to produce certain documents.

The motion was

granted and the plaintiff-taxpayer was ordered to produce the requested documents.

She failed to produce certain documents and

an order of dismissal was entered from which an appeal was taken.
The Florida court said:
We deem it important to note that the
order of dismissal in this case did not contain any finding by the trial court that the
•

-

1

0

-

•
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plaintiff's failure to fully comply with the
order to produce was due to a refusal to do
so. Instead, the court merely found that the
plaintiff had shown an insufficient excuse for
her failure to comply, a distinction which we
feel to be significant. The record before
us is certainly susceptible of the reasonable
interpretation that plaintiff's failure to produce the documents was occasioned by events beyond her control. Since the trial court did
not expressly find, and the record does not
conclusively reveal, that the plaintiff's failure to produce was a refusal to obey, we hold
that the court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice. Id. at
753.
In the instant case, the trial court likewise found the file
contained no justification for Slavens1 failure to comply.

Judge

Sorensen failed to find Slavens' non-appearance was willful be-,
cause of a failure to comply.

The absence of any justification

in the record is not equivalent to willfulness. This is a very
»meaningful distinction.

The record in the instant case fails to

show any willful refusal whatsoever by Slavens to comply with discovery and the absence of any justification in the record certainly
cannot be equated with a willful refusal.

For further support that

the record must clearly reveal willful misconduct, see Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669 (2nd Cir. 1957), in which the Second Circuit said
the record failed to show any willful default for failure to attend
the deposition.
The ultimate sanction, dismissal of the action for failure to
appear,

fl

is the most severe sanction that a court may impose that

its use must be tempered by careful exercise of judicial discretion."

Durgin v. Graham, 372 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1969).

In Firo-

ved v. General Motors Corp,, 277 Minn. 278, 152N.W.2d 364 (1967),
the Minnesota Supreme Court said:
An order of dismissal on procedural grounds runs counter to the priDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
i i may
- contain errors.
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mary objective of the law to dispose
of cases on the merits. Since a dismissal with prejudice operates as an
adjudication on the merits, it is the
most punitive sanction which can be imposed for noncompliance with the rules
or order of the court or for failure to
prosecute. It should therefore be
granted only under exceptional circumstances* Id. at 368.
Also see Scherrer v. Plaza Marina Commercial Corp. , 36 Cal.
App.3d 520, 94 Cal.Rptr. 85 (1971), in which the California court
said:
The ultimate sanction of default against a litigant who wilfully fails to appear
for the taking of his deposition is a drastic
penalty which should be sparingly used; ordinarily, it should be used only when lesser sanctions have failed (Crummer v. Beeler, 185 Cal.
App.2d 851, 8 Cal.Rptr. 698). As the court
said in Caryl Richards, Inc. v. Superior Court,
188 Cal.App.2d 300, 303 10 Cal.Rptr. 337, 379:
"One of the principal purposes
of the Discovery Act (Code Civ. Proc.,
§§2016-2035) is to enable a party to
obtain evidence in the control of his
adversary in order to further the efficient, economical disposition of
cases according to right and justice
on,the merits. [Citations omitted.}
Its purpose is not f to provide a weapon for punishment, forfeiture and the
avoidance of a trial on the merits.'"
(emphasis by court) Id. at 87.
The drastic sanction of dismissal has been invoked in the instant
case as, in fact, a weapon for punishment in which a trial on the
merits has been avoided.

This inference is especially evident

when such a severe sanction is invoked against a defendant for a
single failure to comply.

It is not proper that litigation be

treated as a game, but rather litigation should be disposed of
wherever possible on its merits.
In Rapoport y. Sirott, 418 Pa. 50, 209 A.2d 421 (1965), a default judgment was taken against the defendant in a trespass action
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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for failure to appear at the taking of his deposition.

On appeal,

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the default judgment stating:
The entry of a default judgment by
way of sanction for failure of a party to appear
for the taking of his deposition is a drastic
remedy and should be entered only in the clearest of cases. Unless the failure of a party to
appear for the taking of a deposition is wilful,
i.e., deliberate and intentional, and his duty
to appear is clear and the record clearly and
unequivocally reveals such to be the case, a
default judgment should not be entered. Id.
at 423.
It was error for a default judgment to be entered against defendant Slavens for failure to appear at his deposition because invoking such a drastic sanction is proper only in the clearest of
cases in which evidence conclusively establishes that a party has
willfully frustrated the discovery process and even then, such
willfulness must be clearly set forth in the record.

The standard

of conduct for dismissal of an action is one of willfulness, which
must be clearly evidenced in the record.

Neither is present in

the instant case, therefore, it was error for the court to enter
a default judgment.
POINT II
IT WAS ERROR TO ENTER A DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE ANY SUCH
SEVERE SANCTION IS PROPER ONLY AFTER A PATTERN OF REPEATED AND
PERSISTANT DEFIANCE OF DISCOVERY AND SLAVENS1 SOLE FAILURE TO
APPEAR AT A DEPOSITION FAILS TO ESTABLISH ANY SUCH DEFIANT PATT E R N . ..'.'•.'•;•.'•."•

Even where there has been clear non-compliance by failure to
appear for the taking of a deposition or a failure to produce
specified documents, the party who has so failed to comply is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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usually allowed at least another opportunity to comply before a
default judgment is entered.

See Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effec-

tuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 Colum*L.Rev. 480 (1958), v/hich states:
So ingrained has become this practive of
granting a second chance that in Gill v. Stolow,
the recusant defendant could argue, with fair
justification, that in no case had a federalcourt defaulted a defendant for a first failure
to appear for pretrial examination. ^
73
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, pp. 30-31, Gill v. Stolow,
240 F.2d 669 (2d Cir- 1957); see e.g., Mooney v. Central
Motor Lines, Inc., 222 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1955); Delphy v.
Bernuth, Lembcke Co., 217 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1954); Dictograph Products, Inc. v. Kentworth Corp., 7F.R.D. 543 (W.
D. Ky. 1947).
Also see 4 Moore, Federal Practice, §37.03, n. 35:
. . .most cases in which dismissal or default judgment is ordered under Rule 37(d) are
ones in which there has been repeated and aggravated refusal to make discovery, (emphasis added)
In practice, courts have invested themselves with a wide
range of discretion under subdivision (d) of Rule 37.

In a large

number of the motions brought under this subdivision, the courts
have ordered conditional dismissals or defaults.

The typical or-

der will grant a motion for dismissal or default unless the party
appears for deposition or responds to interrogatories, within a
prescribed period.

.

Defendant Slavens argues that it is a most unusual case in
which a default judgment will be entered without first giving the
delinquent party another opportunity to respond.

The courts have

almost uniformly exhibited a generous attitude to the recusant party and have deemed it better to withhold the thunder bolt of a default judgment on condition of future compliance rather than to
foreclose a determination of the matter on its merits.
-14-
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Expressions

are very frequent that the drastic provision of a default judgment
should be invoked only when a deliberate or flagrant attitude is
demonstrated.

The Second Circuit in Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669

(2nd Cir. 1957), stated:
In final analysis, a court has the responsibility to do justice between man and man; and
general principles cannot justify denial of a
party f s fair day in court except upon a serious
showing of willful default. Id. at 670

.

In Schacht v. Javits, 53 F.R.D. 321,(S.D. N.Y. 1971), the
court said sanctions may be invoked "when there has been a pattern
of abuse."

In Goldstein v. Goldstein, 284 S.2d 227 (Fla. 1973),

the Florida court stated in regard to invoking such a sanction
for a single failure to perform that:
The sanctions are set up as a means to an
end, not the end itself. The end is compliance.
The sanctions should be invoked only in flagrant
cases, certainly in no less than aggravated
cases, and then only after the Court has given
the defaulting party a reasonable opportunity
to conform after originally failing or even refusing to appear. This is unmistakably the
trend of judicial thinking in Florida on the
1
sanction1 Rule. Id. at 227.
In Lizak v. Zadrozny, 4 IU.App. 1023, 283 N.E.2d 252 (1972),
a party failed to appear at a deposition after receiving a proper
notice.

A default judgment was entered.

On appeal, the appellate

court stated "some further effort to obtain compliance should have
been

made before imposing a severe penalty."

For additional sup-

port that Slavens should be given one more additional chance to
redeem himself before such a drastic sanction as a default judgment is entered, see the following case authority:

Housing Author-

ity of City of Alameda v. Gomez, 26 Cal.App.3d 366, 102 Cal.Rptr.
657 (1972); Goldstein v. Goldstein, 284 S.2d 227 (Fla. 1973); Cinelli v. Radcliffe, 35 A.D.2d 829, 3317 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1970); Bender
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v. Pfotenhauer, 21 Ill.App.3d 127, 315 N.E.2d 137 (1974); Rapoport v, Sirott, 418 Pa. 50, 209 A.2d 424 (1965); Beal v. Reinertson, 298 Minn. 542, 225 N-W.2d 57 (1974).
Slavens failure to appear once certainly does not constitute
any such pattern of defiance.

It was error to enter a default

judgment for this single failure to comply with discovery because
the overwhelming case authority accords a recusant party a second
change, or at most, the court should only enter a conditional default judgment.
POINT III
IT WAS ERROR TO ENTER A DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE BASIC
PREMISE OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IS THAT DISPUTES
SHOULD BE RESOLVED ON THEIR MERITS RATHER THAN UPON TECHNICALITIES.
There is an overall policy that the function of procedural
rules is to reach the merits of a dispute.

Literally, the first

rule of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that all the
rules of procedure are to be "liberally construed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive of every action."

The Utah rules

are, in fact, saturated with the premises that they exist to aid,
not abort, the determination of legal controversies on their
merits.

The Utah Rules of Procedure reduce to a minimum the num-

ber of snares over which litigants might trip on their way to the
trial courtroom.

The Supreme Court of Florida has expressed the

same idea in Cabot v. Clearwater Construction Co., 89 S.2d 662
(Fla. 1956):
11

* * *No longer are we concerned with the
'tricks and technicalities of the trade 1 .
The trial of a lawsuit should be a sincere
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effort to arrive at the truth. It is no
longer a game of chess in which the technique of the maneuver captures the prize."
Id. at 664.
Also see Vac-Air, Inc. v. John Mohn & Sons, Inc.; 53 F.R.D.
320 (Ed. Wis. 1971) .
The Utah Rules of Procedure are to be construed as a unit.
The Utah Rules are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action on its merits.

It was error

to enter a default judgment against Slavens for failure to appear
at a deposition because any such default judgment resolves the dispute upon a technicality, and not upon the merits of the controversy, therefore, any such default judgment is fundamentally contrary
to the basic premise upon which the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
are founded.
POINT IV
IT WAS ERROR TO ENTER A DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE ANY SUCH
DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED

WITHOUT A HEARING ON ITS MERITS IS A

DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
There exists a constitutional "due process" limitation on the
sanctions imposed under Rule 37, when such sanctions terminate
either an action entirely or partially.

The Second Circuit discus-

sed these constitutional limitations in Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d
702 (2nd. Cir. 1974), stating:
The Rule has constitutional limitations
which were noted in Mr. Justice Harlan f s opinion for the Court in Societe Internationale v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 2
L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958), in which he stated;
The provisions of Rule 37 which are
here involved must be read in light of
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the provisions of the Fifth Amendment
. that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of .law, and
more particularly against the opinions
of this Court in Hovey v. Elliott, 167
U.S. 409 [17 S.Ct. 841, 42 L.Ed- 215]
and Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas,
212 U.S. 322 [29 S. Ct. 370, 53 L.Ed.
530]. These decisions establish that
there are constitutional limitations
upon the power of courts, even in aid
of their own valid processes, to dismiss
an action without affording a party the
opportunity for a. hearing on the merits
of his cause. The authors of Rule 37
were well aware of these constitutional
considerations. See Notes of Advisory
Committee on Rules, Rule 37, 28 U.S.C.
(1952 e d . ) , p. 4325.
On the record before it, the Court decided
that Rule 37 should not be construed
to authorize dismissal of this complaint
because of petitioner's noncompliance
with a pretrial production order when
it has been established that failure to
comply has been due to inability, and
not to will fulness, bad faith, or any
fault of petitioner.
356 U.S. at 212, 78 S.Ct. at 1096 (footnote omitted). Id. at 708 and 709.
Thus, although the United States Supreme Court, in form, avoided
any direct resolution of the due process question, still the construction placed upon Rule 37(b) by the United States Supreme
Court clearly indicates that a dismissal of the complaint or the
entry of a default judgment for failure to comply with the discovery rules would be improper unless the circumstances of the
noncompliance afford a reasonable basis to presume an admission
by one of a lack of merit in the claim or defense.

As a practi-

cal matter, therefore, any reasonable belief that one's claim or
defense has merit would doubtless be found to exist whenever failure to comply with discovery was shown not to be willful.

The

record in the instant case, standing alone, would certainly sup-18-J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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port any finding that Slavens1 failure to appear did not arise
through willful defiance,.therefore, the court's imposing the ultimate sanction of a default judgment against Slavens is a denial
of his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The appellant respectfully submits that the default partial
summary judgment should be reversed and the controversy decided
on its merits.
Respectfully
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